In 2010, Viktor Orbán, after assuming office, took a firm stance against public-private partnerships (PPP) between the state and private entities, declaring them financially disadvantageous for the government.

He halted or dissolved several existing PPP contracts, arguing they disproportionately favored private actors over the public interest.

Yet, as the years progressed, a notable policy shift occurred, with the Hungarian government once again leaning towards PPP models.

The essence of PPP involves the cooperation between the public sector and private companies to finance, build, and operate projects aimed at public benefit.

Despite initial criticism, the model has deep historical roots in Hungary.

As early as the 19th century, Hungary utilized a PPP approach in constructing the iconic Chain Bridge of Budapest, with a concession to a private company for maintenance and toll collection in exchange for revenue.

A notable example of the complications surrounding PPPs can be drawn from Hungary's post-1989 transition period, particularly with the M5 and M6 motorways.

The M5 motorway's management was transferred to the French-backed AKA corporation, with the expectation they would complete additional sections of the road.

However, exorbitant tolls made the highway less used, prompting state intervention to regulate costs.

Similarly, the M6 motorway was plagued with issues from inadequate financial estimates to unsubstantiated traffic forecasts, leading to substantial financial burdens that still affect Hungarian taxpayers.

With the political shift in 2010, Orbán's government scrutinized previous PPP agreements, claiming many failed in cost-efficiency and rendered excessive state guarantees to private partners.

However, recent years indicate a resurgence of such partnerships with private sector roles expanding in significant public sectors.

For instance, MOL acquired waste management rights, and a Mészáros Lőrinc-László Szíjj consortium secured the operation of the nation's highway network.

This reevaluation is partly driven by developmental and financial imperatives.

Recognizing the strain on state resources, the government has selectively embraced PPPs to expedite infrastructure enhancements and public service delivery.

The modernization of railway station areas on lengthy leases to private investors illustrates this evolving strategy, despite initial public skepticism.

Since 2022, a comprehensive motorway concession was granted over 35 years, projected to yield tens of billions in revenue, managed by entities associated with national oligarchs.

This development raised questions about the state's transition from rejecting to implementing large-scale PPPs reminiscent of the much-criticized pre-2010 models.

Furthermore, Hungary's waste management and railway station projects reflect the ongoing strategy to blend public responsibilities with private expertise and investment.

The Hungarian government's approach illustrates a pragmatic return to PPPs as a fiscal and infrastructural strategy, despite the continual debate over their transparency and long-term benefits.