A detailed security report compiled by intelligence agencies from ten NATO countries and Australia has revealed that Russian spies used sophisticated hacking techniques to compromise surveillance cameras located at the Hungarian-Ukrainian border.

These cameras, connected to the internet, were being utilized to monitor humanitarian aid deliveries and logistical support directed towards Ukraine.

Preliminary estimates indicate that Russian operatives accessed approximately 10,000 cameras situated near military installations and railway stations in order to track the flow of supplies into Ukraine.

The report indicates that Hungary was identified as a target for 2.8% of total attacks, making it the fourth most affected location after Ukraine, Poland, and Romania.

This suggests that around 280 strategically significant sites within Hungary, primarily along the Ukrainian-Hungarian border, were vulnerable to intrusion by Russian hackers, linking to aid shipments and defense-related support.

The hacking group attributed to these activities is known formally as the GRU's 26165 unit, often referred to by informal names such as 'Fancy Bear'.

The report emphasizes not only the desire to identify support directed toward the battlefield but also concerns about potential disruptions to this support through either physical or cyber means, with incidents being regarded as precursors to further actions.

Expert analysis underscores the implications of this camera access, which allows for detailed monitoring of the types and quantities of goods shipped, potentially facilitating weapon target identification.

Military intelligence analyst József Kis-Benedek noted that such intelligence-gathering methods have been a core tactic of the GRU for over a decade.

The Hungarian military intelligence reportedly maintains a capability to counter such hacker attacks, ranging from the physical dismantling of these devices to neutralizing digital incursions.

The attacks have primarily targeted civilian service providers and logistics companies, reflecting a long-standing Russian presence within these networks.

Cybersecurity expert Csaba Krasznay pointed out that the infiltration of industrial cameras is a predictable outcome of these operational strategies.

The GRU employs various techniques throughout different phases of attack, beginning with credential theft through phishing emails targeting services like Microsoft 365.

Following initial breaches, further access and movement within networks can occur, facilitating targeted searches for vulnerable IP-based surveillance cameras, particularly at border and logistical hubs.

Recent events have underscored the risks posed by long-term, sustained operations targeting the entire supply chain.

Krasznay recommended that organizations, especially those involved in logistics and transportation, implement layered defenses, regular password changes, multi-factor authentication, and restrictions on public-facing devices.

Additionally, a report on a recent ransomware attack against Hungary's Defense Procurement Agency indicated a significant security breach, with hackers demanding a ransom in exchange for decrypted sensitive information.

Despite the collaborative efforts of NATO partner intelligence agencies, Hungary's own military intelligence did not participate in this report, raising questions about the sharing of critical data within the framework of multinational security cooperation.

Experts speculate on potential implications of Hungary's non-participation, considering the country's known close ties to Russia, which may have influenced its intelligence-sharing decisions.