Despite its seemingly insignificant title and the minimal prep time given - coupled with it being the end-of-year period - the event largely went unnoticed by the opposition. Thus, with a full show of force from the present Fidesz-KDNP members, who sat in attentive silence, no one else attended, which, according to Antal Rogán, was their loss. At the event, János Lázár, the then-State Secretary of the Prime Minister's Office – later its head, and currently the minister of construction and transport – reminded that the current four nuclear blocks at Paks, considering their sequential commissioning and the ongoing 20-year service life extension, are set to cease operation between 2032 and 2037. Given the desire to continue nuclear-based power generation beyond this point, it was deemed "obvious" to "review" the agreement with the Russian manufacturers of the nuclear power plant, in force since 1966. Although Lázár skirted around the main issue, he summarized to MTI that the government was in advanced talks with Russia for "long-term maintenance of the capacity" of the Paks Nuclear Power Plant.

Indeed, the National Assembly had already given its "principled consent" in 2009, during the Gyurcsány cabinet's tenure, almost unanimously, thus with a cross-party consensus, for the "preparation of a new nuclear power plant".

This decision has since been variously interpreted. While the Orbán government sees it as a clear mandate for Paks 2, the document's preliminary nature is cited by those out of power, including various liberal-green opposition groups, as a reason to strongly reject the project. However, Lázár’s indirect mention also overwrote the Fidesz's post-2010 policy. Until then, the state-owned MVM, following preparations named after Ede Teller and András Lévai, had promised an open, international tender. Thus, the government had even been in talks with potential American, French, or South Korean developers in 2013. Suddenly "realizing" that the current Paks reactors were built by Russians, qualifying Moscow for the expansion – pardon: maintenance – seemed at least surprising. It took a few hours after Lázár's performance for both public opinion and the opposition to grasp that the government planned to entrust the construction of new nuclear blocks at Paks to the Russians. Then, on January 14, 2014, in Moscow, in the "presence" of Viktor Orbán and Vladimir Putin, an interstate agreement was signed for the continuation, namely the construction of two new 1200 megawatt (MW) nuclear blocks. In retrospect, many see a connection between the swift agreement and Russia's annexation of Crimea a few weeks later. Budapest and Moscow also quickly concluded the loan, construction, operation, and fuel supply contracts. According to these, the Russian state will construct the two new blocks for a fixed 12.5 billion euros, providing a 10 billion euro loan with a 3-4 percent interest rate, possibly reducible depending on the market situation. The price is among the lower ones for current nuclear power developments, potentially dampening Rosatom's enthusiasm over time. However, due to the depreciation of the national currency, the amount in today's value has reached 5 trillion forints, and with interest, it approaches 10 trillion.

Although the EU voiced its reservations, by the end of 2015, after extensive examinations, it left the entire process to the Hungarian government. Their conditions included involving EU companies and ensuring that the new blocks would not be associated with MVM or any single ministry. They also scrutinized whether the plan involved any prohibited state aid, a questionable aspect for a project entirely financed by the government. The Hungarian government, citing a report by the Rothschild banking house, argued that the investment would be profitable on commercial terms. Later, it was revealed that the Orbán administration had paid significant fees to Klaus Mangold, the then co-chairman of the bank and known Russian lobbyist. Although the analysis based its return projections on very high electricity price estimates, the government has since unblinkingly portrayed the development as a guarantee for cheap electricity and "cost reduction".

The following years were marked by delays and evasions. Nevertheless, the propaganda machines of Orbán and Putin consistently reported ongoing progress. The expected completion date has been continually pushed back, keeping it consistently about a decade away. The government commissioner for the project since 2014 has been the renowned nuclear expert, Attila Aszódi, professor. In 2017, Viktor Orbán appointed János Süli, who had previously worked on Paks 1, and briefly managed the city of Paks in non-Fidesz colors, as a minister without portfolio for the task – very roundaboutly defined to avoid the word "expansion". Attila Aszódi continued as a state secretary under János Süli. Although the two experts long blamed Brussels for every hitch, this seemed increasingly untenable. For example, the submission of the so-called establishment permit application, deemed crucial for the investment, faced significant delays without a credible explanation. Slip-ups suggested that the Hungarian state client, Paks II Ltd., often sent back plans made in Moscow, embarrassed to present them to the Hungarian Atomic Energy Authority (HAEA). In early 2019, Attila Aszódi was unexpectedly dismissed, not denying the work culture friction with János Süli, who was also revealed to have been wiretapped with Pegasus. The multi-hundred-page application was finally submitted at the end of June 2020. Süli János, who often spoke hesitantly and always emphasized the primacy of nuclear safety, was downgraded to state secretary by Péter Szijjártó, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade, after their 2022 electoral victory, and was sent away in September: his tasks were taken over by the minister himself.

With Péter Szijjártó stepping in, the presentation of the issue reached a new level more aligned with surreal propaganda. The Russian attack on Ukraine, unlike other EU countries - such as Finland, which immediately terminated its Rosatom contract - did not shake the Hungarian government. Thus Brussels continues to suppress any plans to limit the Russian nuclear industry, including Paks 2. While Germany's recent shutdown of its nuclear plants prevents Siemens' involvement, the French seem willing to step in. Péter Szijjártó, dismissing regulations and permits as mere paperwork, now reports almost meter-by-meter on the on-site preparatory work. His statements disregard nuclear regulations. Celebrating the start of construction with the Russian side, they overlooked that according to the International Atomic Energy Agency's rules, construction only begins with what is known as the first concrete pouring. Yet this requires an updated preliminary safety report accepted by HAEA, a requirement they fail to mention in their statements. Now, after years of ensuring the site was free from groundwater and physically protected from the operational Paks blocks through regulatory commands, the minister reports that excavation for the pit has reached its full depth of 23 meters.

Although revised contracts now allegedly reference a 2030 completion, the minister seems to have reluctantly "let go" of this timeline. A recurring theme since last year has been “early 2030s grid connection,” further muddying the waters. While government-affiliated sources like Vg.hu indicate commissioning might slip to 2033-2034, Portfolio suggests it could be 2035-2037. Thus, the goal seems not just delayed but increasingly distant.

Meanwhile, fulfilling warnings from ten years ago, the country has been flooded with cheap solar panels capable of meeting nearly the entire electricity demand. Environmentalists see even less chance for the commissioning of Paks 2, which is expected to consume hundreds of billions annually. Moreover, contrary to previous promises, the government now plans to extend the life of the existing nuclear blocks. As if Lázár János hadn’t cited this very lack in 2013 to justify the investment.